A Panda? No, It's a Sloth: Slowdown Attacks on Adaptive Multi-Exit
  Neural Network Inference by Hong, Sanghyun et al.
A Panda? No, It’s a Sloth: Slowdown Attacks on Adaptive Multi-Exit Neural Network Inference
A PANDA? NO, IT’S A SLOTH: SLOWDOWN ATTACKS
ON ADAPTIVE MULTI-EXIT NEURAL NETWORK INFERENCE
Sanghyun Hong∗, Yigˇitcan Kaya∗, Ionut,-Vlad Modoranu†, Tudor Dumitras,
University of Maryland, College Park, USA
†Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Ias, i, Romania
shhong@cs.umd.edu, yigitcan@cs.umd.edu, modoranu.ionut.vlad@hotmail.com,
tudor@umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Recent increases in the computational demands of deep neural networks (DNNs),
combined with the observation that most input samples require only simple models,
have sparked interest in input-adaptive multi-exit architectures, such as MSDNets
or Shallow-Deep Networks. These architectures enable faster inferences and could
bring DNNs to low-power devices, e.g. in the Internet of Things (IoT). However,
it is unknown if the computational savings provided by this approach are robust
against adversarial pressure. In particular, an adversary may aim to slow down
adaptive DNNs by increasing their average inference time—a threat analogous
to the denial-of-service attacks from the Internet. In this paper, we conduct a
systematic evaluation of this threat by experimenting with three generic multi-exit
DNNs (based on VGG16, MobileNet, and ResNet56) and a custom multi-exit
architecture, on two popular image classification benchmarks (CIFAR-10 and Tiny
ImageNet). To this end, we show that adversarial sample-crafting techniques can be
modified to cause slowdown, and we propose a metric for comparing their impact
on different architectures. We show that a slowdown attack reduces the efficacy
of multi-exit DNNs by 90%–100%, and it amplifies the latency by 1.5–5× in a
typical IoT deployment. We also show that it is possible to craft universal, reusable
perturbations and that the attack can be effective in realistic black-box scenarios,
where the attacker has limited knowledge about the victim. Finally, we show that
adversarial training provides limited protection against slowdowns. These results
suggest that further research is needed for defending multi-exit architectures against
this emerging threat.
1 INTRODUCTION
The inference-time computational demands of deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasing, owing to
the “going deeper" (Szegedy et al., 2015) strategy for improving accuracy: as a DNN gets deeper,
it progressively gains the ability to learn higher-level, complex representations. This strategy has
enabled breakthroughs in many tasks, such as image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) or speech
recognition (Hinton et al., 2012), at the price of costly inferences. For instance, with 4× more
inference cost, a 56-layer ResNet (He et al., 2016) improved the Top-1 accuracy on ImageNet by 19%
over the 8-layer AlexNet. This trend continued with the 57-layer state-of-the-art EfficientNet (Tan &
Le, 2019): it improved the accuracy by 10% over ResNet, with 9× costlier inferences.
The accuracy improvements stem from the fact that the deeper networks fix the mistakes of the shallow
ones (Huang et al., 2018). This implies that some samples, which are already correctly classified by
shallow networks, do not necessitate the extra complexity. This observation has motivated research
on input-adaptive mechanisms, in particular, multi-exit architectures (Teerapittayanon et al., 2016;
Huang et al., 2018; Kaya et al., 2019; Hu et al., 2020). Multi-exit architectures save computation
by making input-specific decisions about bypassing the remaining layers, once the model becomes
confident, and are orthogonal to techniques that achieve savings by permanently modifying the
model (Li et al., 2016; Banner et al., 2018; Han et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2018). Figure 1 illustrates
∗Indicates equal contribution, ordered alphabetically.
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how a multi-exit model (Kaya et al., 2019), based on a standard VGG-16 architecture, correctly
classifies a selection of test images from ‘Tiny ImageNet’ before the final layer. We see that more
typical samples, which have more supporting examples in the training set, require less depth and,
therefore, less computation.
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Figure 1: Simple to complex inputs.
Some Tiny ImageNet images a VGG-16
model can correctly classify if computa-
tion stops at the 1st, 5th, and 14th layers.
It is unknown if the computational savings provided by
multi-exit architectures are robust against adversarial pres-
sure. Prior research showed that DNNs are vulnerable to
a wide range of attacks, which involve imperceptible input
perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Papernot et al., 2016; Hu et al., 2020). Considering that a
multi-exit model, on the worst-case input, does not provide
any computational savings, we ask: Can the savings from
adaptive mechanisms be maliciously negated by input per-
turbations? As some natural inputs do require the full depth
of the model, it may be possible to craft adversarial exam-
ples that delay the correct decision; it is unclear, however,
how many inputs can be delayed with imperceptible pertur-
bations. Furthermore, it is unknown if universal versions
of these adversarial examples exist, if the examples transfer
across multi-exit architectures and datasets, or if existing defenses (e.g. adversarial training) are
effective against slowdown attacks.
Threat Model. We consider a new threat against DNNs, analogous to the denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks that have been plaguing the Internet for decades. By imperceptibly perturbing the input to
trigger this worst-case, the adversary aims to slow down the inferences and increase the cost of using
the DNN. This is an important threat for many practical applications, which impose strict limits on
the responsiveness and resource usage of DNN models (e.g. in the Internet-of-Things (Taylor et al.,
2018)), because the adversary could push the victim outside these limits. For example, against a
commercial image classification system, such as Clarifai.com, a slowdown attack might waste valuable
computational resources. Against a model partitioning scheme, such as Big-Little (De Coninck et al.,
2015), it might introduce network latency by forcing excessive transmissions between local and
remote models. A slowdown attack aims to force the victim to do more work than the adversary, e.g.
by amplifying the latency needed to process the sample or by crafting reusable perturbations. The
adversary may have to achieve this with incomplete information about the multi-exit architecture
targeted, the training data used by the victim or the classification task.
Our Contributions. To our best knowledge, we conduct the first study of the robustness of multi-exit
architectures against adversarial slowdowns. To this end, we find that examples crafted by prior
evasion attacks (Madry et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2020) fail to bypass the victim model’s early exits, and
we show that an adversary can adapt such attacks to the goal of model slowdown by modifying its
objective function. We call the resulting attack DeepSloth. We also propose an efficacy metric for
comparing slowdowns across different multi-exit architectures. We experiment with three generic
multi-exit DNNs (based on VGG16, ResNet56 and MobileNet) (Kaya et al., 2019) and a specially-
designed multi-exit architecture, MSDNets (Huang et al., 2018), on two popular image classification
benchmarks (CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet). We find that DeepSloth reduces the efficacy of multi-
exit DNNs by 90%–100%, i.e., the perturbations render nearly all early exits ineffective. In a scenario
typical for IoT deployments, where the model is partitioned between edge devices and the cloud, our
attack amplifies the latency by 1.5–5×, negating the benefits of model partitioning. We also show that
it is possible to craft a universal DeepSloth perturbation, which can slow down the model on either
all or a class of inputs. While more constrained, this attack still reduces the efficacy by 5%–45%.
Further, we observe that DeepSloth can be effective in some black-box scenarios, where the attacker
has limited knowledge about the victim. Finally, we show that a standard defense against adversarial
samples—adversarial training—is inadequate against slowdowns. Our results suggest that further
research will be required for protecting multi-exit architectures against this emerging security threat.
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2 RELATED WORK
Adversarial Examples and Defenses. Prior work on adversarial examples has shown that DNNs are
vulnerable to test-time input perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot
et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). An adversary who wants to maximize
a model’s error on specific test-time samples can introduce human-imperceptible perturbations to
these samples. Moreover, an adversary can also use a surrogate model for launching the attack and
still hurt an unknown victim (Athalye et al., 2018; Tramèr et al., 2017b; Inkawhich et al., 2019).
This transferability leads to adversarial examples in more practical black-box scenarios. Although
many defenses (Kurakin et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Lecuyer
et al., 2019) have been proposed against this threat, adversarial training (AT) have become the
frontrunner (Madry et al., 2018). In Sec 5 we evaluate the vulnerability of multi-exit DNNs to
slowdowns in white-box and black-box scenarios; in Sec 6, we show that standard AT and its simple
adaptation to our perturbations are not sufficient for preventing slowdown attacks.
Efficient Input-Adaptive Inference. Recent input-adaptive DNN architectures have brought two
seemingly distant goals closer: achieving both high predictive quality and computational efficiency.
A common implementation of adaptive DNNs is using multi-exit architectures (Teerapittayanon et al.,
2016; Huang et al., 2018; Kaya et al., 2019). To a model, these architectures introduce multiple side
branches—or early-exits or internal classifiers. During the inference on an input sample, these models
can preemptively stop the computation once the stopping criteria are met at one of the branches. To
best of our knowledge, our work shows for the first time that the computational savings afforded by
these mechanisms are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations.
Model Partitioning. Model partitioning has been proposed to bring DNNs to resource-constrained
devices (De Coninck et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2018). These schemes split a multi-exit model into
sequential components and deploy them in separate endpoints, e.g., a small, local on-device part
and a large, cloud-based part. For bringing DNNs to the Internet of Things (IoT), partitioning is
instrumental as it reduces the transmissions between endpoints, a major bottleneck. In Sec 5.1, on a
partitioning scenario, we show that our attack can force excessive transmissions.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Datasets. We use two datasets: CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009) and Tiny-ImageNet (Tiny). For
testing the cross-domain transferability of our attacks, we use the CIFAR-100 dataset.
Figure 2: The EEC curves. Each curve shows the
fraction of test samples a model classifies using a
certain fraction of its full inference cost. ‘EFCY’
is the model’s efficacy.
Architectures and Hyper-parameters. To
demonstrate that the vulnerability to adversar-
ial slowdowns is common among multi-exit ar-
chitectures, we experiment on two recent tech-
niques: Shallow-Deep Networks (SDNs) (Kaya
et al., 2019) and MSDNets (Huang et al., 2018).
These architectures were designed for different
purposes: SDNs are generic and can convert any
DNN into a multi-exit model, and MSDNets are
custom designed for efficiency. We evaluate an
MSDNet architecture (6 exits) and three SDN ar-
chitectures, based on VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zis-
serman, 2014) (14 exits), ResNet-56 (He et al.,
2016) (27 exits), and MobileNet (Howard et al.,
2017) (14 exits).
Metrics. We define the early-exit capability
(EEC) curve of a multi-exit model to indicate the
fraction of the test samples that exit early at a spe-
cific fraction of the model’s full inference cost. Figure 2 shows the EEC curves of our SDNs on Tiny
ImageNet, assuming that the computation stops when there is a correct classification at an exit point.
For example, the VGG-16 model can correctly classify ∼50% of the samples using ∼50% of its full
cost. Note that this stopping criterion is impractical; in Sec 4, we will discuss the practical ones.
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We define the early-exit efficacy, or efficacy in short, to quantify a model’s ability of utilizing its
exit points. The efficacy of a multi-exit model is the area under its EEC curve, estimated via the
trapezoidal rule. An ideal efficacy for a model is close to 1, when most of the input samples the
computation stops very early; models that do not use their early exits have 0 efficacy. A model with
low efficacy generally exhibits a higher latency; in a partitioned model, the low efficacy will cause
more input transmissions to the cloud, and the latency is further amplified by the network round trips.
A multi-exit model’s efficacy and accuracy are dictated by its stopping criteria, which we discuss in
the next section. As for the classification performance, we report the Top-1 accuracy on the test data.
4 ATTACKING THE MULTI-EXIT ARCHITECTURES
Setting. We consider the supervised classification setting with standard feedforward DNN archi-
tectures. A DNN model consists of N blocks, or layers, that process the input sample, x ∈ Rd,
from beginning to end and produce a classification. A classification, F (x, θ) ∈ Rm, is the predicted
probability distribution of x belonging to each label y ∈M = {1...m}. Here, θ denotes the tunable
parameters, or the weights, of the model. The parameters are learned on a training set D that contains
multiple (xi, yi) pairs; where yi is the ground-truth label of the training sample xi. We use θi to
denote the parameters at or before the ith block; i.e., θi ⊂ θi+1 and θN = θ.
Multi-Exit Architectures. A multi-exit model contains K exit points—internal classifiers—attached
to a model’s hidden blocks. We use Fi to denote the ith exit point, which is attached to the jth block.
Using the output of the jth (j < N ) block on x, Fi produces an internal classification, i.e., Fi(x, θj),
which we simply denote as Fi(x). In our experiments, we set K = N for SDNs, i.e., one internal
classifier at each block and K = 6 for MSDNets. Given Fi(x), a multi-exit model uses deterministic
criteria to decide between forwarding x to compute Fi+1(x) and stopping for taking the early-exit at
this block. Bypassing early-exits decreases a network’s efficacy as each additional block increases
the inference time. Note that multi-exit models process each sample individually, not in batches.
Practical Stopping Criteria. Ideally, a multi-exit model stops when it reaches a correct classification
at an exit point, i.e., argmaxj∈M F
(j)
i (x) = yˆi = y; y is the ground-truth label. However, for unseen
samples, this is impractical as y is unknown. The prior work has proposed two simple strategies
to judge whether yˆi = y: Fi(x)’s entropy (Huang et al., 2018; Teerapittayanon et al., 2016) or its
confidence (Kaya et al., 2019). Our attack (see Sec 4.3) leverages the fact that a uniform Fi(x)
has both the highest entropy and the lowest confidence. For generality, we experiment with both
confidence-based—SDNs—and entropy-based—MSDNets—strategies.
A strategy selects confidence, or entropy, thresholds, Ti, that determine whether the model should
take the ith exit for an input sample. Conservative Ti’s lead to fewer early exits and the opposite hurts
the accuracy as the estimate of whether yˆi = y becomes unreliable. As utility is a major practical
concern, we set Ti’s for balancing between efficiency and accuracy. On a holdout set, we set the
thresholds to maximize a model’s efficacy while keeping its relative accuracy drop (RAD) over its
maximum accuracy within 5% and 15%. We refer to these two settings as RAD<5% and RAD<15%.
Table 2 (first segment) shows how accuracy and efficacy change in each setting.
4.1 THREAT MODEL
We consider an adversary who aims to decrease the early-exit efficacy of a victim model. The attacker
crafts an imperceptible adversarial perturbation, v ∈ Rd that, when added to a test-time sample
x ∈ S, prevents the model from taking early-exits.
Adversary’s Capabilities. The attacker is able to modify the victim’s test-time samples to apply the
perturbations, e.g., by compromising a camera that collects the data for inference. To ensure the
imperceptibility, we focus on `∞ norm bounded perturbations as they (i) are well are studied; (ii) have
successful defenses (Madry et al., 2018); (iii) have prior extension to multi-exit models (Hu et al.,
2020); and (iv) are usually the most efficient to craft. We show results on `2 and `1 perturbations
in Appendix C. In line with the prior work, we bound the perturbations as follows: for CIFAR-10,
||v||∞ ≤  = 0.03 (Madry et al., 2017), ||v||1 ≤ 8 (Tramèr & Boneh, 2019) and ||v||2 ≤ 0.35 (Chen
et al., 2017); for Tiny ImageNet, ||v||∞ ≤  = 0.03 (Yang et al., 2019), ||v||1 ≤ 16 and ||v||2 ≤ 0.6.
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Adversary’s Knowledge. To assess the security vulnerability of multi-exit architectures, we study
white-box scenarios, i.e., the attacker knows all the details of the victim model, including its D and
θ. Further, in Sec 5.2, we study more practical black-box scenarios, i.e., the attacker crafts v on a
surrogate model and applies it to an unknown victim model.
Adversary’s Goals. We consider three DeepSloth variants, (i) the standard, (ii) the universal and
(iii) the class-universal. The adversary, in (i) crafts a different v for each x ∈ S; in (ii) crafts a single
v for all x ∈ S; in (iii) crafts a single v for a target class i ∈M . Further, although the adversary does
not explicitly target it; we observe that DeepSloth usually hurts the accuracy.
4.2 STANDARD ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS DO NOT CAUSE DELAYS
To motivate DeepSloth, we first evaluate whether previous adversarial attacks have any effect on the
efficacy of multi-exit models. These attacks add imperceptible perturbations to a victim’s test-time
samples to force misclassifications. We experiment with the standard PGD attack (Madry et al.,
2017); PGD-avg and PGD-max variants against multi-exit models (Hu et al., 2020) and the Universal
Adversarial Perturbation (UAP) attack that crafts a single perturbation for all test samples (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017). Table 1 summarizes our findings that these attacks, although they hurt the
accuracy, fail to cause any meaningful decrease in efficacy. In many cases, we observe that the
attacks actually increase the efficacy. These experiments help us to identify the critical elements of
the objective function of an attack that decreases the efficacy.
Table 1: Impact of existing evasion attacks on efficacy. Each entry shows a model’s efficacy (left) and
accuracy (right) when subjected to the respective attack. The multi-exit models are trained on CIFAR-10 and
use RAD<5% as their early-exit strategy.
NETWORK NO ATTACK PGD-20 PGD-20 (AVG.) PGD-20 (MAX.) UAP
VGG-16 0.77 / 89% 0.79 / 29% 0.85 / 10% 0.81 / 27% 0.71 / 68%
RESNET-56 0.52 / 87% 0.55 / 12% 0.82 / 1% 0.70 / 6% 0.55 / 44%
MOBILENET 0.83 / 87% 0.85 / 14% 0.93 / 3% 0.89 / 12% 0.77 / 60%
4.3 THE DEEPSLOTH ATTACK
The Layer-Wise Objective Function. Figure 3 shows that the attacks that only optimize for the final
output, e.g., PGD or UAP, does not perturb the model’s earlier layer representations. This does not
bypass the early-exits, which makes these attacks ineffective for decreasing the efficacy. Therefore,
we modify the objective functions of adversarial example crafting algorithms to incorporate the
outputs of all Fi|i < K. For crafting `∞, `2 and `1-bounded perturbations, we adapt the PGD (Madry
et al., 2017), the DDN (Rony et al., 2019) and the SLIDE algorithms (Tramèr & Boneh, 2019),
respectively. Next, we describe how we modify the PGD algorithm—we modify the others similarly:
vt+1 =Π||v||∞<
(
vt + α sgn
(
∇v
∑
x∈D′
∑
0<i<K
L (Fi (x+ v) , y¯)
))
Here, t is the current attack iteration; α is the step size; Π is the projection operator that enforces
||v||∞ <  and L is the cross-entropy loss function. The selection of D′ determines the type of the
attack. For the standard variant: D′ = {x}, i.e., a single test-time sample. For the universal variant:
D′ = D, i.e., the whole training set. For the class-universal variant against the target class i ∈ M :
D′ = {(x, y) ∈ D|y = i}, i.e., the training set samples from the ith class. Finally, y¯ is the target
label distribution our objective pushes Fi(x) towards. Next, we explain how we select y¯.
Pushing Fi(x) Towards a Uniform Distribution. Despite including all Fi, attacks such as PGD-
avg and PGD-max (Hu et al., 2020) still fail to decrease efficacy. How these attacks select y¯
reflects their goal of causing misclassifications and, therefore, they trigger errors in early-exits, i.e.,
argmaxj∈M F
(j)
i (x) = y¯ 6= y. However, as the early-exits still have high confidence, or low entropy,
the model still stops its computation early. We select y¯ as a uniform distribution over the class labels,
i.e., y¯(i) = 1/m. This ensures that (x+ v) bypasses common stopping criteria as a uniform Fi(x)
has both the lowest confidence and the highest entropy.
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5 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Here, we present the results for `∞ DeepSloth against two SDNs—VGG-16 and MobileNet-based—
and against the MSDNets. In the Appendix, we report the hyperparameters; the `1 and `2 attacks;
the results on ResNet-56-based SDNs; the cost of the attacks; and some perturbed samples. Overall,
we observe that `∞-bounded perturbations are more effective for slowdowns. The optimization
challenges might explain this, as `1 and `2 attacks are usually harder to optimize (Carlini & Wagner,
2017; Tramèr & Boneh, 2019). Unlike objectives for misclassifications, the objective for slowdowns
involves multiple loss terms and optimizes over all the output logits.
5.1 WHITE-BOX SCENARIOS
Perturbations Eliminate Early-Exits. Table 2 (second segment) shows that the victim models
have ∼ 0 efficacy on the samples perturbed by DeepSloth. Across the board, the attack makes the
early-exit completely ineffective and force the victim models to forward all inputs samples till the
end. Moreover, DeepSloth also drops the victim’s accuracy by 75-99%, comparable to the PGD
attack. These results give an answer to our main research question: the multi-exit mechanisms are
vulnerable and their benefits can be maliciously offset by input perturbations.
Note that crafting a single perturbation requires multiple back-propagations through the model
and more floating points operations (FLOPs) than the forward pass. The high cost of crafting,
relative to the computational damage to the victim, might make this vulnerability unattractive for
the adversary. In the next sections, we highlight scenarios where this vulnerability might lead to
practical exploitation. First, we show that in an IoT-like scenarios, the input transmission is a major
bottleneck and DeepSloth can exploit it. Second, we evaluate universal DeepSloth attacks that enable
the adversary to craft the perturbation only once and reuse it on multiple inputs.
Table 2: The effectiveness of `∞ DeepSloth. ‘RAD<5,15%’ columns list the results in each early-exit setting.
Each entry includes the model’s efficacy (left) and accuracy (right). The class-universal attack’s results are an
average of 10 classes. ‘TI’: Tiny ImageNet and ‘C10’: CIFAR-10.
NETWORK MSDNET VGG16 MOBILENET
SET. RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15%
BASELINE (NO ATTACK)
C10 0.89 / 85% 0.89 / 85% 0.77 / 88% 0.89 / 79% 0.83 / 87% 0.92 / 79%
TI 0.64 / 55% 0.83 / 50% 0.39 / 57% 0.51 / 52% 0.42 / 57% 0.59 / 51%
DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.06 / 17% 0.06 / 17% 0.01 / 13% 0.04 / 16% 0.01 / 12% 0.06 / 16%
TI 0.06 / 7% 0.06 / 7% 0.00 / 2% 0.01 / 2% 0.02 / 6% 0.04 / 6%
UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.85 / 65% 0.85 / 65% 0.62 / 65% 0.86 / 60% 0.73 / 61% 0.90 / 59%
TI 0.58 / 46% 0.81 / 41% 0.31 / 47% 0.44 / 44% 0.33 / 47% 0.51 / 43%
CLASS-UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.82 / 32% 0.82 / 32% 0.47 / 35% 0.78 / 33% 0.60 / 30% 0.85 / 27%
TI 0.41 / 21% 0.71 / 17% 0.20 / 28% 0.33 / 27% 0.21 / 27% 0.38 / 25%
Attacking an IoT Scenario. Many IoT scenarios, e.g., health monitoring for elderly (Park et al.,
2017), require collecting data from edge devices and making low-latency inferences on this data.
However, complex deep learning models are impractical for low-power edge devices, such as an
Arduino, that are common in the IoT scenarios (Chen & Ran, 2019). For example, on standard
hardware, an average inference takes MSDNet model on Tiny ImageNet 35M FLOPs and ∼10ms.
A potential solution is sending the inputs from the edge to a cloud model, which then returns the
prediction. Even in our optimistic estimate with a nearby AWS EC2 instance, this back-and-forth
introduces ∼11ms latency per inference. Model partitioning alleviates this bottleneck by splitting a
multi-exit model into two; deploying the small first part at the edge and the large second part at the
cloud (De Coninck et al., 2015). The edge part sends an input only when its prediction does not meet
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the stopping criteria. For example, the first early-exit of MSDNets sends only 5% and 67% of all test
samples, on CIFAR-10 and Tiny ImageNet, respectively. This leads to a lower average latency per
inference, i.e., from 11ms down to 0.5ms and 7.4ms, respectively.
The adversary we study uses DeepSloth perturbations to force the edge part to send all the input
samples to the cloud. For the victim, we deploy MSDNet models that we split into two parts at their
first exit point. Targeting the first part with DeepSloth forces it to send 96% and 99.97% of all test
samples to the second part. This increases average inference latency to ∼11ms and invalidates the
benefits of model partitioning. In this scenario, perturbing each sample takes ∼2ms on a Tesla V-100
GPU, i.e., the time adversary spends is amplified by 1.5-5× as the victim’s latency increase.
Reusable Universal Perturbations. The universal attacks, although limited, are a practical as the
adversary can reuse the same perturbation indefinitely to cause minor slowdowns. Table 2 (third
segment) shows that they decrease the efficacy by 3-21% and the accuracy by 15-25%, over the
baselines. Having a less conservative early-exit strategy, e.g., RAD<15%, increases the resilience to
the attack at the cost of accuracy. Further, MSDNets are fairly resilient with only 3-9% efficacy drop;
whereas SDNs are more vulnerable with 12-21% drop. The attack is also slightly more effective on
the more complex task, Tiny ImageNet, as the early-exits become easier to bypass. Using random
noise as a baseline, i.e., v ∼ Ud(−, ), we find that at most it decreases the efficacy by ∼3%.
In the universal attack, we observe a phenomenon: it pushes the samples towards a small subset of all
classes. For example, ∼17% of the perturbed samples are classified into the ’bird’ class of CIFAR-10;
up from ∼10% for the clean samples. Considering certain classes are distant in the feature space,
e.g. ’truck’ and ’bird’; we expect the class-universal variant to be more effective. The results in
Table 2 (fourth segment) confirm our intuition. We see that this attack decreases the baseline efficacy
by 8%-50% and the accuracy by 50%-65%. We report the average results across multiple classes;
however, we observe that certain classes are slightly more vulnerable to this attack.
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Figure 3: Visualising features against attacks using UMAP. VGG-16’s 3rd (left), 8th (middle), and 14th
(right) hidden block features on CIFAR-10’s ’dog’ class (Best viewed in color, zoomed in).
Feature Visualization of DeepSloth. In Figure 3, to shed light on how DeepSloth differs from prior
attacks, e.g., PGD and PGD-avg, we visualize a model’s hidden block (layer) features on the original
and perturbed test-time samples. We observe that in an earlier block (left panel), DeepSloth seems to
disrupt the original features slightly more than the PGD attacks. Leaving earlier representations intact
prevents PGDs from bypassing the early-exits. The behaviors of the attacks diverge in the middle
blocks (middle panel). Here, DeepSloth features remain closer to the original features than prior
attacks. The significant disruption of prior attacks leads to high-confidence misclassifications and
fails to bypass early-exits. In the later block (right panel), we see that the divergent behavior persists.
5.2 TOWARDS A BLACK-BOX ATTACK: TRANSFERABILITY OF DEEPSLOTH
Transferability of adversarial examples imply that they can still hurt a model that they were not
crafted on (Tramèr et al., 2017a; Liu et al., 2017). Even though white-box attacks are important
to expose the vulnerability, black-box attacks, by requiring fewer assumptions, are more practical.
Here, on three distinct scenarios, we investigate whether DeepSloth is transferable. Based on the
scenario’s constraints, we (i) train a surrogate model; (ii) craft the DeepSloth samples on it; (iii) use
these samples on the victim. We run these experiments on CIFAR-10 in the RAD<5%.
Cross-Architecture. First, we relax the assumption that the attacker knows the victim architecture.
We evaluate the transferability between a VGG-16-based SDN an an MSDNet—all trained using
the same D. We find that the samples crafted on the MSDNet can slowdown the SDN: reducing its
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efficacy to 0.63 (from 0.77) and accuracy to 78% (from 88%). Interestingly, the opposite seems not
to be the case: on the samples crafted against the SDN, the MSDNet still has 0.87 efficacy (from
0.89) and 73% accuracy (from 85%). This hints that DeepSloth transfers if the adversary uses an
effective multi-exit models as the surrogate.
Limited Training Set Knowledge. Second, we relax the assumption that the attacker knows the
victim’s training set, D. Here, the attacker only knows a random portion of D, i.e., 10%, 25%, and
50%. We use VGG-16 architecture for both the surrogate and victim models. In the 10%, 25% and
50% settings, respectively, the attacks reduce the victim’s efficacy to 0.66, 0.5, 0.45 and 0.43 (from
0.77); its accuracy to 81%, 73%, 72% and 74% (from 88%). Overall, the more limited the adversary’s
D is, the less generalization ability the surrogate has and the less transferable the attacks are.
Cross-Domain. Third, we relax the assumption that the attacker exactly knows the victim’s task.
Here, the attacker uses D∫ to train the surrogate, different from the victim’s D altogether. We use a
VGG-16 on CIFAR-100 as the surrogate and attack a VGG-16-based victim model on CIFAR-10.
This transfer attack reduces the victim’s efficacy to 0.63 (from 0.77) and its accuracy to 83% (from
88%). We see that the cross-domain attack might be more effective than the limited D scenarios.
This makes DeepSloth particularly dangerous as the attacker, without knowing the victim’s D, can
collect a similar dataset and still slow down the victim. We hypothesize the transferability of earlier
layer features in CNNs (Yosinski et al., 2014) enables the perturbations attack to transfer from one
domain to another, as long as they are similar enough.
6 STANDARD ADVERSARIAL TRAINING IS NOT A COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we examine whether a defender can adapt a standard countermeasure against adversar-
ial perturbations, adversarial training (AT) (Madry et al., 2018), to mitigate our attack. AT decreases a
model’s sensitivity to perturbations that significantly change the model’s outputs. While this scheme
is effective against adversarial examples that aim to trigger misclassifications; it is unclear whether
using our DeepSloth samples for AT can also robustify a multi-exit model against slowdown attacks.
To evaluate, we train our multi-exit models as follows. We first take a base network—VGG-16—and
train it on CIFAR-10 on PGD-10 adversarial examples. We then convert the resulting model into
a multi-exit architecture, using the modification from (Kaya et al., 2019). During this conversion,
we adversarially train individual exit points using PGD-10, PGD-10 (avg.), PGD-10 (max.), and
DeepSloth; similar to (Hu et al., 2020). Finally, we measure the efficacy and accuracy of the trained
models against PGD-20, PGD-20 (avg.), PGD-20 (max.), and DeepSloth, on CIFAR-10’s test-set.
Table 3: Evaluating adversarial training against slowdown attacks. Each entry includes the
model’s efficacy score (left) and accuracy (right). Results are on CIFAR-10, in the RAD<5% setting.
ADV. TRAINING NO ATTACK PGD-20 PGD-20 (AVG.) PGD-20 (MAX.) DEEPSLOTH
UNDEFENDED 0.77 / 89% 0.79 / 29% 0.85 / 10% 0.81 / 27% 0.01 / 13%
PGD-10 0.61 / 72% 0.55 / 38% 0.64 / 23% 0.58 / 29% 0.33 / 70%
PGD-10 (AVG.) 0.53 / 72% 0.47 / 36% 0.47 / 35% 0.47 / 35% 0.32 / 70%
PGD-10 (MAX.) 0.57 / 72% 0.51 / 37% 0.54 / 30% 0.52 / 34% 0.32 / 70%
OURS 0.74 / 72% 0.71 / 38% 0.82 / 14% 0.77 / 21% 0.44 / 67%
OURS + PGD-10 0.61 / 73% 0.55 / 38% 0.63 / 23% 0.58 / 28% 0.33 / 70%
Our results in Table 3 verify that AT provides resilience against all PGD attacks. Besides, AT provides
some resilience to our attack: DeepSloth reduces the efficacy to ∼0.32 on robust models vs. 0.01
on the undefended one. However, we identify a trade-off between the robustness and efficiency of
multi-exits. Compared to the undefended model, on clean samples, we see that robust models have
lower efficacy—0.77 vs. 0.53∼0.61. We observe that the model trained only with our DeepSloth
samples (Ours) can recover the efficacy on both the clean and our DeepSloth samples, but this model
loses its robustness against PGD attacks. Moreover, when we train a model on both our DeepSloth
samples and PGD-10 (Ours + PGD-10), the trained model suffers from low efficacy. Our results
imply that a defender may require an out-of-the-box defense, such as flagging the users whose queries
bypass the early-exits more often than clean samples for which the multi-exit network was calibrated.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
This work exposes the vulnerability of input-adaptive inference mechanisms against adversarial
slowdowns. As a vehicle for exploring this vulnerability systematically, we propose DeepSloth, an
attack that introduces adversarial perturbations to test-time inputs for offsetting the computational
benefits of multi-exit inference mechanisms. We show that a white-box attack, which perturbs each
sample individually, eliminates any computational savings these mechanisms provide. We also show
that it is possible to craft universal slowdown perturbations, which can be reused, and transferrable
samples, in a black-box setting. Moreover, adversarial training, a standard countermeasure for
adversarial perturbations, is not effective against DeepSloth. Our analysis suggests that slowdown
attacks are a realistic, yet under-appreciated, threat against adaptive models.
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A HYPERPARAMETERS
In our experiments, we use the following hyperparameters to craft adversarial perturbations.
`∞-based DeepSloth. We find that `∞-based DeepSloth does not require careful tuning. For the
standard attack, we set the total number of iterations to 30 and the step size to α = 0.002. We
compute the standard perturbations using the entire 10k test-set samples in CIFAR-10 and Tiny
Imagenet. For the universal variants, we set the total number of iterations to 12 and reduce the initial
step size of α = 0.005 by a factor of 10 every 4 iterations. To compute a universal perturbation, we
use randomly chosen 250 (CIFAR-10) and 200 (Tiny Imagenet) training samples.
`2-based DeepSloth. For both the standard and universal attacks, we set the total number of iterations
to 550 and the step size γ to 0.1. Our initial perturbation has the `2-norm of 1.0. Here, we use the
same number of samples for crafting the standard and universal perturbations as the `∞-based attacks.
`1-based DeepSloth. For our standard `1-based DeepSloth, we set the total number of iterations to
250, the step size α to 0.5, and the gradient sparsity to 99. For the universal variants, we reduce the
total number of iterations to 100 and set the gradient sparsity to 90. Other hyperparameters remain
the same. We use the same number of samples as the `∞-based attacks, to craft the perturbations.
B COST OF CRAFTING DEEPSLOTH SAMPLES
ATTACKS TIME (SEC.)
PGD-20 38
PGD-20 (AVG.) 48
PGD-20 (MAX.) 475
DEEPSLOTH 24
UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH 2
Table 4: Time it takes to craft attacks.
In Table 4, we compare the cost of DeepSloth with
other attack algorithms on a VGG16-based CIFAR-
10 model—executed on a single Nvidia Tesla-V100
GPU. For the universal DeepSloth, we measure the
execution time for crafting a perturbation using one
batch (250 samples) of the training set. For the other
attacks, we measure the time for perturbing the whole
test set of CIFAR-10. Our DeepSloth takes roughly
the same time as the PGD and PGD-avg attacks and
significantly less time than the PGD-max attack. Our
universal DeepSloth takes only 2 seconds (10x faster than DeepSloth) as it only uses 250 samples.
C EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF `1 AND `2 DEEPSLOTH
Table 5 and Table 6 shows the effectiveness of `1-based and `2-based DeepSloth attacks, respectively.
Table 5: The effectiveness of `1 DeepSloth. ‘RAD<5,15%’ columns list the results in each early-exit
setting. Each entry includes the model’s efficacy score (left) and accuracy (right). The class-universal
attack’s results are an average of 10 classes. ‘TI’ is Tiny Imagenet and ‘C10’ is CIFAR-10.
NETWORK MSDNET VGG16 MOBILENET
SET. RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15%
BASELINE (NO ATTACK)
C10 0.89 / 85% 0.89 / 85% 0.77 / 89% 0.89 / 79% 0.83 / 87% 0.92 / 79%
TI 0.64 / 55% 0.83 / 50% 0.39 / 57% 0.51 / 52% 0.42 / 57% 0.59 / 51%
DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.36 / 51% 0.35 / 51% 0.12 / 36% 0.34 / 45% 0.18 / 41% 0.49 / 53%
TI 0.23 / 37% 0.51 / 40% 0.08 / 22% 0.15 / 25% 0.08 / 33% 0.19 / 35%
UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.89 / 83% 0.89 / 83% 0.75 / 85% 0.88 / 75% 0.82 / 85% 0.92 / 77%
TI 0.64 / 55% 0.83 / 50% 0.38 / 57% 0.51 / 52% 0.41 / 57% 0.59 / 51%
CLASS-UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.88 / 73% 0.88 / 73% 0.69 / 78% 0.86 / 67% 0.76 / 74% 0.89 / 65%
TI 0.64 / 54% 0.83 / 49% 0.39 / 59% 0.50 / 58% 0.41 / 60% 0.58 / 53%
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Table 6: The effectiveness of `2 DeepSloth. ‘RAD<5,15%’ columns list the results in each early-exit
setting. Each entry includes the model’s efficacy score (left) and accuracy (right). The class-universal
attack’s results are an average of 10 classes. ‘TI’ is Tiny Imagenet and ‘C10’ is CIFAR-10.
NETWORK MSDNET VGG16 MOBILENET
SET. RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15%
BASELINE (NO ATTACK)
C10 0.89 / 85% 0.89 / 85% 0.77 / 89% 0.89 / 79% 0.83 / 87% 0.92 / 79%
TI 0.64 / 55% 0.83 / 50% 0.39 / 57% 0.51 / 52% 0.42 / 57% 0.59 / 51%
DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.52 / 64% 0.52 / 64% 0.22 / 60% 0.45 / 62% 0.23 / 46% 0.48 / 55%
TI 0.24 / 42% 0.52 / 44% 0.13 / 35% 0.21 / 36% 0.12 / 38% 0.25 / 40%
UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.89 / 81% 0.89 / 81% 0.75 / 87% 0.88 / 76% 0.81 / 84% 0.92 / 76%
TI 0.63 / 54% 0.82 / 48% 0.38 / 56% 0.51 / 52% 0.41 / 56% 0.58 / 51%
CLASS-UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.88 / 73% 0.88 / 73% 0.71 / 81% 0.86 / 70% 0.76 / 76% 0.89 / 66%
TI 0.64 / 53% 0.83 / 49% 0.38 / 57% 0.50 / 57% 0.41 / 58% 0.58 / 53%
Our results show that the `1- and `2-based attacks are less effective than the `∞-based attacks. In
contrast to the `∞-based attacks that eliminate the efficacy of victim multi-exit models, the `1-
and `2-based attacks reduce the efficacy of the same models by 0.24∼0.65. Besides, the accuracy
drops caused by `1- and `2-based attacks are in 6∼21%, smaller than that of `∞-based DeepSloth
(75∼99%). Moreover, we see that the universal variants of `1- and `2-based attacks can barely reduce
the efficacy of multi-exit models—they decrease the efficacy up to 0.08 and the accuracy by 12%.
D EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF DEEPSLOTH ON RESNET56
Table 7 shows the the effectiveness of our DeepSloth attacks on ResNet56-base models.
Table 7: The effectiveness of DeepSloth on the ResNet-based models. ‘RAD<5,15%’ columns
list the results in each early-exit setting. Each entry includes the model’s efficacy score (left) and
accuracy (right). The class-universal attack’s results are an average of 10 classes.
NETWORK RESNET (`∞) RESNET (`1) RESNET (`2)
SET. RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15% RAD<5% RAD<15%
BASELINE (NO ATTACK)
C10 0.52 / 87% 0.69 / 80% 0.52 / 87% 0.69 / 80% 0.51 / 87% 0.69 / 80%
TI 0.25 / 51% 0.39 / 46% 0.25 / 51% 0.39 / 46% 0.25 / 51% 0.39 / 46%
DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.00 / 19% 0.01 / 19% 0.05 / 43% 0.18 / 47% 0.06 / 45% 0.17 / 48%
TI 0.00 / 7% 0.01 / 7% 0.04 / 27% 0.10 / 28% 0.05 / 34% 0.13 / 35%
UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.35 / 63% 0.59 / 60% 0.49 / 84% 0.68 / 75% 0.48 / 85% 0.67 / 76%
TI 0.25 / 25% 0.34 / 37% 0.25 / 51% 0.39 / 46% 0.25 / 51% 0.38 / 46%
CLASS-UNIVERSAL DEEPSLOTH
C10 0.23 / 33% 0.48 / 29% 0.39 / 70% 0.60 / 61% 0.39 / 71% 0.60 / 61%
TI 0.11 / 21% 0.23 / 18% 0.23 / 51% 0.36 / 46% 0.23 / 50% 0.36 / 46%
Our results show that ResNet56-based models are vulnerable to all the `∞, `2, and `1-based DeepSloth
attacks. Using our `∞-based DeepSloth, the attacker can reduce the efficacy of the victim models
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to 0.00∼0.01 and the accuracy by 39∼68%. Besides, the `2, and `1-based attacks also decrease the
efficacy to 0.04∼0.18 and the accuracy by 11∼44%. Compared to the results on MSDNet, VGG16,
and MobileNet in Table 5 and 6, the same attacks are more effective. The universal variants decrease
the efficacy up to 0.21 and the accuracy up to 24%. In particular, the `2, and `1-based attacks (on
CIFAR-10 models) are effective than the same attacks on MSDNet, VGG16, and MobileNet models.
E ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FROM STANDARD ATTACKS AND DEEPSLOTH
In Figure 4, we visualize the adversarial examples from the PGD, UAP and our DeepSloth attacks.
Standard Attacks DeepSloth
Original PGD PGD (avg.) PGD (max.) UAP Per-sample Universal Class-specific
`inf of the Perturbations (on Average)
`inf 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Figure 4: Adversarial examples from the standard and our DeepSloth attacks. The leftmost
column shows the clean images. In the next four columns, we show adversarial examples from PGD,
PGD (avg.), PGD (max.), and UAP attacks, respectively. The last four columns include adversarial
examples from the three variants of DeepSloth. Each row corresponds to each sample, and the last
row contains the average `inf -norm of the perturbations over the eight samples in each attack.
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